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FOREWORD

Mao Tse-tung counseled, “To achieve victory we must as
far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his
eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by
creating confusion in their minds.” Few concepts mesh so
contextually with Mao than the Chinese approach to
Information Warfare (IW). As the People’s Republic of
China struggles with its national military strategy, IW
offers opportunities to win wars without the traditional
clash of arms.
In this monograph, Mr. Toshi Yoshihara explores what
he perceives to be China’s pursuit of IW as a method of
fighting asymmetric warfare against the United States.
Largely imitative of U.S. thoughts, literature, and practices
on IW, he believes the Chinese are seeking ways to adapt it
to their own style of warfare. Paradoxically, he observes
that the Chinese have not gleaned their intelligence
through espionage, but through careful scrutiny of U.S. IW
in practice. The Persian Gulf War and Kosovo conflict have
provided ample largess to the Chinese archives.
Mr. Yoshihara examines those aspects of IW—PSYOPS,
Denial, and Deception—that China believes provides the
greatest prospects for victory in a conflict. Not surprisingly,
Sun Tzu is interwoven into this emerging theory. Targeting
the enemy’s “nervous system” at all levels, that is, his ability
to gather and assess information and then transmit orders,
provides significant advantages in the prosecution of a
campaign. Targeting the enemy’s homeland defenses and
its citizens can potentially end a war before it even starts.
He concludes that the extent of Chinese advances or intent
regarding IW is difficult to ascertain given its closed society.
Chinese IW may still be nascent, but the menacing intent is
there and only vigilance will protect the United States.
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Much in the realm of IW remains speculative and
conceptual. Aspiring nations can take advantage of the
Revolution in Military Affairs by skipping generations of
technology and becoming a modern, sophisticated threat,
obviating the need for significant financial investments.
The consequences of the threat are of great import to today’s
strategic leaders and thinkers. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of
debate that will continue into the millennium.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

In recent years, China has demonstrated an intense
fascination with information warfare (IW). The potential
advances in Chinese IW doctrine and capabilities have
direct implications for U.S. national security. The ability of
China to conduct information warfare against the United
States in peacetime, confrontation, or conflict could pose
severe challenges to defense planners. Yet, American
understanding of China’s approaches to IW within the
academic and defense communities remain shallow. This
lack of understanding, both stemming from the extreme
secrecy surrounding China’s military programs in general
and the nascent stage of development in IW in particular,
could invite ugly strategic and operational surprises for the
United States.
As an initial step to clarify the future direction of
Chinese IW and to identify new areas for further research,
this monograph explores Chinese perspectives of
information warfare through a sampling of the burgeoning
open literature circulating in China. The monograph
provides a preliminary assessment of these Chinese
writings and analysis. It demonstrates some linkages and
parallels to America’s current debates on IW, the
Soviet-U.S. competition, Clausewitz’s classic dictums, and
Chinese strategic culture. The monograph concludes with
implications of future developments in Chinese IW for
American policy.
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CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE
A PHANTOM MENACE OR EMERGING
THREAT?

Dazzled by Information Warfare.
In the past decade, China’s military modernization and
growing interest in the revolution in military affairs (RMA)
have increasingly attracted international attention. Like
many other military powers, China has exploited the
unprecedented general peace in the international security
environment to reexamine and experiment with its own
defense capabilities and doctrine. In particular, the concept
of information warfare (IW) has emerged as a subject of
great interest in Chinese military discourse. The intense
discussions and debates within China’s defense community
suggest that Beijing may be harnessing the political will to
devote substantial resources to developing IW doctrines and
capabilities. China’s potential ability to leverage the
information revolution accompanied by its gradual rise as a
major military power have led many observers to speculate
whether China might succeed in becoming one of the global
leaders in IW.
China’s appreciation for the centrality of information as
a tool of statecraft and military power has significant
implications. Given the tremendous advances in
information technologies both in terms of the rate of
innovation and quality of improvements, China is well
positioned to exploit this revolution. Just as China has
surprised skeptical observers with its rapid developments
in nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and space programs,
the Chinese may similarly come to the forefront in IW. More
importantly, China’s focus on IW presents a potentially
daunting challenge for American defense planners. In two
cyber-attack exercises in 1997 and 1999, the U.S. military
found that a group of hackers “using publicly available
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resources was able to prevent the United States from
waging war effectively.” The Pentagon premised the first
drill on a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The result
of the exercise was sobering: the series of attacks against
civilian and military networks had a paralyzing effect on
American command and control at the highest levels of
leadership. It is therefore conceivable that IW could provide
China with the capacity to hinder American military
operations in the Asia-Pacific, a region of central
importance to U.S. national security interests. Hence, the
direction of China’s IW strategy has direct policy relevance
to the United States.
In recent years, the Chinese have demonstrated a
voracious appetite for examining IW. Arguably, only the
United States and Russia rival China’s analytical work in
IW. The exotic concepts and capabilities of IW have
seemingly captivated the imagination of Chinese futurists
and military strategists alike. Indeed, a virtual cottage
industry has developed around the topic in Chinese
literature on military affairs. How China will translate
theoretical discussions on IW into practice will be an
increasingly important policy question for the United
States.
The author first explores Chinese thinking on IW
through a literature survey of primary sources. Strategists
have demonstrated a keen interest in understanding the
theoretical concepts, requirements, and capabilities
necessary to conduct IW in future conflict. The second
component of the monograph assesses the existing Chinese
IW literature. While Chinese thinkers have clearly begun to
grapple with the opportunities and challenges of waging
IW, the analytical gaps in their writings suggest that China
still has a long way to go before it can embark on the quest
for information supremacy (if that is, in fact, Beijing’s goal).
Finally, the author speculates on how Chinese thinking on
IW could impact its future application. While the evidence
remains scant at present, how the Chinese might use IW to
achieve their political objectives may have unsettling
2

consequences for the United States. This monograph is not a
call to arms for American defense planners. However, the
potential path that China might pursue in IW and the
associated risks to U.S. national interests warrant careful
observation and preparation against surprise.
What is IW?
Since the concept of IW emerged in the mid-1990s as a
topic of heated debate, its definition remains in a state of
continual flux. Scholars, think tanks, and the U.S.
Government have all struggled to provide an intellectual
construct for the study of IW. Efforts to grapple with this
“exotic” type of warfare continue today, and little consensus
has yet emerged. The intellectual fever to come to grips with
IW has also spread to China, resulting in similar degrees of
disagreement over the meaning of IW. The
conceptualization of IW in the Chinese context has been
even more confused given that Beijing, by the nature of its
opaqueness, has not published any official documentation of
IW as a guide for national policy. There is no discernible
taxonomy that can be meaningfully used to accurately
depict Chinese IW. Only China’s open sources, many of
which are of dubious quality or reliability, have offered
some clues on Chinese thinking.
While not an exact scientific measure, a sampling of U.S.
doctrinal writings on IW could provide a useful frame of
reference and possibly some context for comparison
between Chinese and American thinking. According to a
document on U.S. joint doctrine entitled Information
Operations, IW is “actions taken to affect an adversary’s
information and information systems while defending one’s
own information and information systems.” The Pentagon’s
Joint Vision 2020 adds that, “Information operations also
include actions taken in a noncombat or ambiguous
situation to protect one’s own information and information
systems as well as those taken to influence target
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information and information systems.” 3 These vague
definitions of IW clearly require further clarification.
At the heart of IW is information. Information guides
decisionmaking in peacetime and war at the strategic (a
decision to declare war), operational (a decision to move a
division of forces forward for an attack), or tactical (a
decision to order an aircraft to engage) levels. These
decisions in turn trigger action. The purpose of IW is to
affect the adversary’s decisionmaking process and
associated actions to one’s own advantage. The outcome for
the enemy can be wrong decisions, late decisions, or no
decisions at all. This enables the attacker to control the
opponent or, failing that, to prevent the adversary from
carrying out a decision. To succeed in IW, one must achieve
information superiority over the enemy. Joint Vision 2010
defined information superiority as “the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information, while exploiting or denying an adversary’s
ability to do the same.”4 Information superiority requires
both offensive and defensive components. In Joint Vision
2020, information superiority is simply understood as an
“imbalance in one’s favor in the information domain.”5
There are six central pillars of IW in the current
American lexicon:6
• Physical Attack/Destruction: The use of kinetic force,
such as cruise missiles, to inflict damage on enemy systems
or personnel sufficient to render them unusable. This type of
IW can be used defensively to prevent the adversary from
using offensive IW.
• Electronic Warfare (EW): The control of the
electromagnetic spectrum to undermine the enemy’s
electronic warfare capabilities through electromagnetic
energy, directed energy, and antiradiation weapons.
• Computer Network Attack (CNA): The use of
computers and telecommunications equipment to disrupt,
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deny, degrade, and destroy enemy computers, computer
networks, and the information being transmitted.
• Military Deception: The manipulation, distortion, and
falsification of information to mislead or deceive the
adversary’s military commander, thereby forcing the enemy
to act (or not act) to its own disadvantage.
• Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): The use of
communications (such as propaganda) and actions intended
to mislead to influence the perceptions, motives, and
emotions of the enemy.
• Operations Security (OPSEC): Security measures that
prevent the enemy from collecting or analyzing information
that may be useful to it.
A recent study uses U.S. joint doctrine as a construct to
highlight the differences between Chinese and American
IW. Kate Farris argues that, “the U.S. tends to focus on the
CNA aspect of IW, while the Chinese take a more broad
perspective, emphasizing pillars such as PSYOP, Denial,
and Deception.”7 While the author’s selection of Chinese
literature persuasively supports this assessment, the
current state of Chinese IW is simply too immature and not
well enough understood to reach any definitive conclusion.
As Farris herself admits, “the Chinese debate on IW is still
evolving, there is some uncertainty remaining over how
they will incorporate IW into their military doctrine and
strategy.”8 Clearly, more data and continued observation of
Chinese developments are required. Her analysis
nevertheless highlights the potential utility of comparative
analysis for better understanding Chinese thinking on IW.
Indeed, subsequent sections of this monograph show how
closely Chinese interpretations dovetail with (if not copy)
America’s ongoing examination of IW.
Triumph of the Information Revolution?
What explains China’s intense interest in IW? At the
broadest level, the Chinese clearly realize the implications
5

of the information revolution. First, China recognizes the
importance of high technology and the growing power of
information in the era of globalization and interdependence.
Second, China aspires to become a major political and
economic player in a global community where information
power retains a critical place in dictating interstate
relations. Given that economic development remains its
highest national priority, China’s integration into the
information-based international economic system has in
turn magnified the appeal of information. Third, as a
corollary to the previous point, the Chinese believe that, as
China increases its comprehensive national power, the
world will eventually shift from a unipolar to a multipolar
world, in which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be
a coequal.9 In sum, the ability to compete economically and
wage high-technology warfare with information
technologies will be critical components of China’s national
strength.
From a strategic and military perspective, IW promises
to compensate for China’s largely antiquated conventional
armed forces. First, IW could enable the Chinese to fight
from a position of relative weakness, particularly against
far superior military powers like the United States and
Japan. In recent defense parlance, information technologies
provide “asymmetric capabilities” to state and nonstate
actors. While definitions of asymmetric warfare have varied
and evolved over time, the basic concept is the use of
unorthodox methods and capabilities that avoid or undercut
an adversary’s strengths while inflicting disproportionate
damage on the enemy’s weaknesses.10 In a hypothetical
confrontation between China and the United States, the
backwardness of Chinese forces would undoubtedly invite
defeat. Since the Chinese cannot possibly hope to fight on
American terms, they must therefore find other means to
deter or defeat the United States. IW provides Beijing with
the potential capacity to reach directly into the American
homeland, which has been far beyond the very limited
power projection capabilities of China’s military. The
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Chinese could attack vulnerable critical infrastructures in
the United States to influence or manipulate domestic
public perceptions and, in turn, weaken America’s political
will to intervene or fight. This need to leverage weakness in
order to defeat a superior foe, a central and still influential
philosophy of Mao Zedong’s people’s war concept, has a
powerful hold on Chinese thinkers.
Second, many Chinese believe that IW is one of the few
technological arenas where the contest for supremacy
among the great powers remains undetermined. By
exploiting the information revolution, China hopes to
leapfrog generations of obsolescent technologies in order to
catch up with the developed world.11 The Chinese believe
that IW could offer a low-cost, quick fix to their backward
forces, especially when compared to a full-fledged military
build-up. America’s conventional military supremacy, a
critical benchmark for the Chinese military, further
underscores the difficulties of overcoming conventional
military inferiority. Chinese strategists hope to capitalize
on the integrative powers of information technologies to
improve the performance of existing equipment without
incurring prohibitive expenses.12 A prominent phenomenon
in the information technology revolution (popularly known
as “Moore’s Law”) is that, while information processing
power has accelerated over the last 2 decades, the costs per
unit capacity have plummeted at an exponential rate.13
However, this proposition holds true only for specific
items and capabilities. The costs of systems or architectures
that support the warfighting end of the military force have
actually risen significantly relative to conventional military
items. As Martin van Creveld points out, “even as the
per-bit cost of data processing fell by a factor of ten over each
of the three decades from 1950 to 1980, the cost of command
systems rose so much that it now threatens to swallow up
entire defense budgets.”14 He presciently concludes, “Given
the problem of rising costs, the dilemma is likely to become
even more important in the future.”15 Similarly, the pace of
Chinese development in IW will largely “hinge on” the costs
7

of IW capabilities that Beijing hopes to exploit. Depending
on how broadly the Chinese conceptualize IW and which
aspect(s) they want to pursue, some items or systems may
be beyond China’s reach at present. For example,
information-gathering tools, such as reconnaissance
satellites and the associated support systems, require
substantial and sustained financial commitments. Beijing
has not tangibly demonstrated the political will to embark
on such an ambitious modernization effort. While China’s
economic growth has been spectacular in the past 2 decades,
stagnant trends in recent years have already defied the
euphoric linear projections of some economists. Hence, IW
as an alternative to conventional military power may not be
sustainable or realistic in the long term. Nevertheless, this
line of reasoning on the benefits of information technologies
has remained compelling for Chinese military thinkers.
China has therefore not discounted itself from this
technological race.
Third, the Gulf War highlighted the growing centrality
of IW. The high-tech weaponry (supported by sophisticated
information systems) showcased during the conflict and the
wholesale destruction of advanced weapons (largely
Russian and Chinese in origin) shocked and galvanized the
military leadership. Similar to America’s “Vietnam
Syndrome,” China was just emerging from the deep malaise
in the aftermath of the bloody and inconclusive war against
Vietnam in 1979. The apparent inferiority, perhaps even
irrelevance of Chinese equipment compared to American
weaponry during the Gulf War finally spurred the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to embrace the study of
high-technology war and, particularly, IW. In 1993, General
Liu Huaqing, the former Vice Chairman of the Central
Military Commission and the vocal military leader credited
with starting China’s current military modernization,
lamented the failure of the PLA to meet the standards of
modern warfare. He pointed specifically to the Gulf War
conflict as the model for the Chinese when studying future
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wars.16 Chinese interest in this area intensified further in
the aftermath of the NATO air campaign over Kosovo.17
The appreciation for information and its potential
advantages in future warfare led Chinese analysts to
speculate and theorize on how they might acquire their own
set of doctrine and capabilities. Subsequent writings since
the mid-1990s have demonstrated a keen interest (though
not necessarily the analytical capacity) among strategists to
explore, study, and absorb IW. Similar to the vague
descriptions of IW currently circulating in America’s
defense community, China’s evolving and fluid debates on
IW have thus far remained abstract. At present no clear
consensus has yet emerged in China on the specific aspects
of IW the Chinese hope to develop. As a latecomer to the
realm of IW, China has little foundation on which to base its
intellectual discourse. As a result, the Chinese have often
mimicked unclassified American works and security
debates on IW as the literature survey below illustrates.
More interestingly, many have tried to express their views
by applying or comparing Sun Tzu’s Art of War to IW. These
efforts to adopt IW by finding new expression in strategic
tradition could have profound influences on how the
Chinese approach IW. The intersection between Beijing’s
own conception of IW, which is still in the embryonic stages,
and China’s strategic culture may produce strategies that
are uniquely Chinese. The resulting degree of divergence
from Western understanding of IW could enable China to
harness the potential for unleashing ugly surprises against
its adversaries.
The Chinese Buy into the RMA.
China’s analysis of the RMA was the central starting
point for recent Chinese discussions on IW in the 1990s and
the early 21st century. Chinese military strategists have
devoted significant energy in the study of the RMA for more
than a decade. For example, analysts monitored closely
Soviet Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov’s work on America’s
9

revolution in technical military affairs in the 1980s.
However, the notion of an RMA did not gain genuine
currency in Chinese military circles until after the Gulf
War. The Kosovo air campaign further reinforced the
growing awareness of IW.
As a result of these two major high-technology conflicts
waged in the past decade, Chinese military analysts
generally recognize and accept that some type of revolution
in warfare is afoot. One strategist noted that the command
and control capabilities demonstrated during Desert Storm
represented a “great transformation.” 18 One article
marveled at the perfect execution of the conflict. Another
writer declared, “The unfolding of the new military
revolution worldwide is a prominent feature of the
international security situation . . . [It] involves such fields
as military thinking, military strategy, operational
doctrine, military organization, and arms development.”19
One analyst further elaborated on this new military
revolution stating that, “. . . there will be an overall
qualitative leap in the military field of all countries—the
possession by the military forces of high-quality personnel,
integrated C4I systems, high-level training and education,
intelligent arms, scientific organization, and creative
military doctrines.”20 A Chinese commentator made an even
more sweeping claim that “the beginning of the 1990s
opened the curtain on the information war era and marked
the sudden appearance of the third military revolution.”21
As the last observation hinted, the Chinese recognize
that information technologies are an integral part of the
so-called RMA. Chinese strategists clearly identify the
direct link between information superiority and victory in
conflict. One article noted that the information technology
revolution is the
core and foundation of this military revolution, because
information and knowledge have changed the previous practice
of measuring military strength by simply counting the number
of armored divisions, air force wings, and aircraft carrier battle
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groups. Nowadays, one must take into account some invisible
forces, such as computing capabilities, communications
capacity, and system reliability. 22

According to another analyst, “Information technology has .
. . become an indispensable means for better command and
communication. Combat between opposing forces is, firstly,
between their capabilities in gathering, processing, and
analyzing information.”23 The author argues that the ability
to decide and act faster and better than the enemy—a
central concept of American information superiority—is a
prominent part of modern conflict. In future wars, weapons
systems and military units will be increasingly
“information-intensified.”24
These statements on the characteristics of the RMA
demonstrate a strong conviction among some Chinese
military analysts that information technologies will be the
critical foundation for success in future wars. Recent
Chinese literature on IW also suggests that strategists have
gradually developed a deeper understanding of IW. Indeed,
some general conclusions on the future of IW may be
coalescing among Chinese analysts.
Chinese Views on IW Strategies.
Major General Wang Pufeng, widely recognized as the
founder of Chinese IW, produced a sweeping working
definition of IW. According to the author:
Information war is a product of the information age which to a
great extent utilizes information technology and information
ordnance in battle. It constitutes a “networkization”
(wangluohua)of the battlefield, and a new model for a
complete contest of time and space. At its center is the fight to
control the information battlefield, and thereby to influence or
decide victory or defeat.25

Another definition synthesizes a more concrete Chinese
understanding of IW:
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IW is combat operations in a high-tech battlefield environment
in which both sides use information- technology means,
equipment, or systems in a rivalry over the power to obtain,
control, and use information. IW is a combat aimed at seizing
the battlefield initiative; with digitized units as its essential
combat force; the seizure, the control, and use of information as
its main substance, and all sorts of information weaponry
[smart weapons] and systems as its major means.26

More specifically, the main objective of information war
is to attack the adversary’s information systems while
protecting the information infrastructure of one’s own
forces. Based on a large collection of Chinese primary
sources, James Mulvenon argues that, “the aim of IW in the
Chinese literature is information dominance
[zhixinxiquan].” 27 Similar to the American concept of
“information superiority,”28 Chinese IW seeks to disrupt the
enemy’s decisionmaking process by interfering with the
adversary’s ability to obtain, process, transmit, and use
information. The paralysis of the opponent’s information
system and decisionmaking cycle would, in turn, destroy the
adversary’s will to resist or fight on. For instance, IW would
attack the enemy’s command and control systems in order
to confuse or blind enemy forces. This notion of attacking
the adversary’s command and control systems mirrors the
strategies employed during the Gulf War and the Kosovo air
campaign. In both conflicts, American forces launched an
intensive effort to destroy and bring down the enemy’s
“nervous system” in order to weaken the ability of the
enemy’s kinetic weapons force to respond or fight. However,
Chinese discussions broaden IW further. Some analysts
argue that an effective information attack could completely
disrupt an adversary’s military operations and therefore
preclude the need for a direct military confrontation. The
author examines at length whether the Chinese have
mistakenly lost sight of the need to field a kinetic weapons
force in tandem with command and control warfare.
This IW concept of attacking and destroying the enemy’s
command and control capabilities has received great
12

attention among Chinese commentators. One analyst
argues that IW combat is a struggle between the command
and control systems of the opposing forces. He asserts, “A
winning force enters the battle after already winning the
battle . . . The goal that confrontation of command pursues is
to ‘win in strategy,’ because only by doing so can one win a
war or even stop a war.”29 In other words, the side that wins
in the struggle for battlefield command determines the
outcome of wars. He observes that the multinational forces
in the Gulf War defeated Iraq by first destroying its ability
to command its forces. “Without the power to ‘win in
strategy,’ they [the Iraqis] also lost the power to ‘win in
battle’.”30 The author argues that the duel over command
must precede combat on the ground. More intriguing, the
analyst’s approach to warfare suggests that information
dominance offers the potential to overawe the enemy into
surrendering, hence negating the need for actual physical
engagement. This type of psychological intimidation
through IW—essentially aimed at scaring the enemy into
dropping their swords—is deeply embedded in Sun Tzu’s
philosophy. Strategic advantage (shih), a central feature of
the Art of War, connotes the release of latent energy, both
physical and psychological, in order to ride the forces of
circumstances to victory. Whether the Chinese genuinely
believe that command warfare has eclipsed kinetic force
combat remains to be seen.
According to one author, “In waging IW, ‘the best combat
method is to attack by strategy’ . . . to obstruct or upset the
enemy’s decisionmaking procedure, so as to make the
enemy unable to adopt coordinated actions. To be more
precise, the main objective of IW is to hit the enemy’s
cognitive system as well as information system.”31 In terms
of the actual application of force, the writer conjures the
notion of hitting the enemy’s vital points. “The salient
feature of IW is that high-precision, high-speed,
over-the-horizon attacks become its basic fire application
pattern and that the nonstylized ‘vital point’-styled
structural destruction will replace the traditional-stylized
13

battles.” 3 2 The author equates the enemy’s main
vulnerabilities to its ability to process information and
make decisions. Identifying, locating, and then attacking
such centers of gravity (cognitive and information systems)
are central to this concept of IW.
According to the Liberation Army Daily, “an attacker can
go around the enemy’s solid works he has long labored for
and, by way of ‘surgical removal’ and ‘digital acupoint
pressure’ (selective attacks), launch precision raids to
destroy the enemy’s war resources and shatter his will to
resist.”33 Similar to U.S. military thinking, this focus on
targeting the opponent’s will hints at a very broad
conception of IW, including psychological operations.
Another writer describes the ability of IW to seek out and
destroy the enemy’s vital points in much more vivid terms.
“Information intensified combat methods are like a Chinese
boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring
an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement.”34 A
Chinese Defense University publication issued a similar
prescription on IW. “Paralyze the enemy by attacking the
weak link of his C3I as if hitting his acupuncture point in
kungfu combat.” The foregoing analyses again suggest that
the Chinese believe a successful attack against vital points
would cripple the adversary and negate the need to engage
in further combat.35 The notion that centers of gravity, a
traditional concept in warfare, might be informationrelated is a major driving force behind the current debates
on the new RMA worldwide. The Chinese have clearly
grasped the significance of the relationship between
information and center of gravity.
Chinese discussions on IW have centered on the strategy
of disrupting the command and control capabilities of the
adversary. The literature often presumes that locating and
then successfully attacking the enemy’s centers of gravity is
achievable. Interestingly, this concept of crippling the
opponent’s ability to act or gain initiative on the battlefield
by targeting information systems parallels (if not parrots)
the American notion of information dominance, which
14

overlays traditional kinetic weaponry as a force multiplier.
Another subtheme that emerges in the literature is the
influence of Chinese strategic tradition. The recurrent
notion of attacking the enemy’s strategy without actually
engaging in combat reflects the indelible imprint of Sun
Tzu’s philosophy and demonstrates Chinese efforts to
internalize IW within a familiar strategic framework.
Interestingly, Western militaries, particularly the
American armed forces, have also become enamored with
Sun Tzu.36 Beyond the broad strategies that the Chinese
have developed, strategists have also distilled very specific
conclusions on how IW would be applied in the future.
Chinese Views on IW Capabilities.
Despite the offensive nature of the IW strategies
outlined above, the Chinese divide IW into two broad
categories of offensive and defensive capabilities. In the
offense, IW seeks to attack directly the enemy’s information
systems. This includes the physical destruction and
suppression of the enemy’s information operations, such as
jamming, weakening, or shutting down the adversary’s
command and control. Analysts recognize that as China
becomes more dependent on IW in future conflicts, Chinese
systems would likely be subject to attack as well. Indeed,
Chinese observers have scrutinized the Kosovo conflict with
great interest to distill lessons learned on potential
defensive strategies. Strategists unanimously concur that
enhancing resistance to interference and heightening
defense against physical attacks are critical requirements
for Chinese IW.37 Defending one’s own platforms and
ensuring the normal functioning of command and control
have become equally important compared to the offense.
Chinese strategists agree that both the offensive and
defensive elements of IW require a robust and effective
command and control system. IW and any other type of
warfare depend on command and control as the architecture
and central nervous system. According to one author,
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All activities of information operations are centering around
command and control. Command and control cover all areas of
information operations and work throughout the whole process
of operation, affecting and regulating the overall situation. Any
mistakes in command and control will seriously jeopardize an
information operation. Therefore, in the study of information
operations, we must pay close attention to command and control
as the core.38

One major objective of C2 is to “obtain timely information, to
understand the enemy and ourselves, and to achieve clarity
about our situation with great determination.” 39 As
mentioned above, command and control warfare also seeks
to destroy the enemy’s ability to acquire, transmit, process,
and use information while protecting one’s own systems in
order to achieve information superiority. For example,
command and control systems would coordinate precision
strikes and electronic warfare by locating, tracking,
attacking, and assessing the damage to enemy targets.
An effective command and control capability requires a
wide range of information technologies aimed at increasing
the reliability of remote sensing and reconnaissance
systems. One author predicts that, “The 21st century will
see broad use of high-resolution photography in
surveillance satellites, combined air-ground early warning
systems for guided missiles, infrared detection systems,
deep strike surveillance and control planes, and much use of
unmanned reconnaissance planes.”40 The specific tools of
offensive and defensive IW include: (1) physical destruction;
(2) dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum; (3)
computer network warfare; and (4) psychological
manipulation. Interestingly, these capabilities almost
mirror U.S. doctrine on IW. While the views on specific
types of IW differ somewhat between various analysts,
several discrete IW applications have dominated recent
discourse from the late 1990s to the present. The following
briefly discusses the four main aspects of IW:
• Precision Strike Warfare. The Chinese envision “hard”
weapons that would physically destroy the enemy’s
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headquarters, command posts, and C2 facilities. Smart,
stealthy, and over-the-horizon weapons would be able to
perform precise and “clean” deep strikes. The delivery
systems include guided bombs, guided artillery shells,
cruise missiles, and antiradiation missiles. Sound waves,
electric waves, visible light, infrared waves, lasers, and
gases would guide the weapon’s sensors.41
• Electronic Warfare. The Chinese concur that the
contest for the electromagnetic spectrum to gain battlefield
initiative is a crucial phase of warfare. The objective is to
dominate the spectrum while denying the enemy’s effective
use of electronic equipment. For the offense, one would
utilize electronic jamming, electronic deception,
directed-energy weapons, and electromagnetic pulse
weapons. Hardening of facilities, dispersion,
countermeasures, and physical retaliation would constitute
the defense. Microelectronics will become a key
technological area for investment.42
• Computer Network Warfare. Chinese strategists cover
a wide range of technologies and capabilities in computer
warfare. Networked computers would digitize the
battlefield, increase the transparency of the battlefield to
commanders, and provide real-time data. Computer
warfare can manifest itself in more exotic forms such as
cyber and hacker wars. Analysts discuss virtual warfare as
a means to deceive enemy forces with simulated false
commands.43 Virtual simulations would also prepare
Chinese forces prior to actual combat.44
• Psychological Warfare and Deception. This mode of
warfare involves the transmission of information or
misinformation to influence the intended audiences’
emotions, mode of thinking, and ultimately their behavior.
Aimed at both the military and public as the audience,
psychological warfare would exert pressure and weaken the
enemy’s will to carry on the fight.45 The primary tools
include media propaganda (television and radio), leaflet
distribution, e-mail, and other forms of communication.
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While the existing literature lacks details on specific
programs, some recent articles hint at Chinese interest in
developing certain technologies, particularly in the areas of
remote sensing and reconnaissance. A Chinese researcher
at the Huabei Photo-electronics Technology Research
Institute offered a rare interview on the military utility of
photo-electronics. The researcher outlined various ongoing
projects in photo-electronic technologies that would aid
China in future conflicts. These include the display of
clearer imagery; increase in information transmission
speed; higher storage densities; miniaturized
photo-electronic devices and systems; and fusion of
microwave technologies with photo-electronics.46
Another article revealed Chinese interest in airborne
and space-based synthetic aperture radar. The system
would be used to detect enemy dispositions and to assess
battle damage to enemy forces. According to the author,
China is expected to launch its first space-based radar in
2003.47 A Liberation Army Daily published an extensive
interview with experts on military mapping. This
distinguished group of engineers, professors, and
researchers discussed remote sensing and navigation
satellites; multi-resolution, three-dimensional digitized
imagery; and all-weather, real-time reconnaissance
capabilities, among other topics.48 Clearly then, remote
sensing and reconnaissance, a central component of modern
command and control, have attracted increasing attention
within the Chinese scientific and defense communities.
A Preliminary Evaluation of Chinese IW Literature.
While China’s IW literature and American
interpretations of Chinese writings cover a broad range of
concepts and capabilities, most analyses lack concrete
evidence on the future direction of Chinese IW. Chinese IW
doctrine and force structure have remained frustratingly
elusive. The writings often theorize on the benefits of IW
and tend to present a wish list of capabilities that the
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Chinese hope to acquire. These abstractions reveal the
extent to which the Chinese are still struggling with a
highly amorphous and ill-defined concept in warfare.
However, some preliminary assessments can be made about
the existing literature on IW.
Are the Chinese Copy Cats? As noted earlier, Chinese
interpretations of IW dovetail closely with the notion of
information dominance in American military doctrine. In
many cases, the Chinese have borrowed heavily from (and
even outright plagiarized) open literature and security
debates within the United States.49 Mulvenon identifies
several Chinese writings that are virtually identical to the
U.S. Air Force’s “Six Pillars of IW” and Joint Vision 2010.
For example, one author’s definition of IW as “electronic
warfare, tactical deception, strategic deterrence,
propaganda warfare, psychological warfare, computer
warfare, and command and control warfare” mirrors the Air
Force’s conception of IW. 50 The Chinese have also
translated in full the Joint Doctrine for Command and
Control Warfare (JP3-13.1) and Field Manual (FM)-100-3.51
This peculiar tendency to reproduce American doctrine
further evidences the daunting theoretical and analytical
difficulties that the Chinese have encountered in studying
IW. Indeed, this phenomenon of intellectual imitation is
highly reminiscent of Soviet literature on nuclear strategy
and doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s.52 If the Chinese are
merely mimicking American discourse, then the writings
further obscure China’s real intentions and capabilities in
IW. More importantly, the intellectual debates raging in the
United States are simply incompatible with the current
capabilities and needs of the Chinese. The primitive critical
infrastructure in China, while rapidly expanding in recent
years, is not nearly as vulnerable as the American
counterpart. The Chinese also do not have the advanced
systems to conduct offensive IW on the scale of the United
States.
Why, then, are the Chinese engaged in a potentially
fruitless exercise? It may be that China is simply extracting
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the benefits and lessons from the American experience in
IW through imitation. However, such a conclusion would be
an oversimplification of Chinese realities that could cloud
better understanding of China’s developments in IW. In the
preface of China Debates the Future Environment, Michael
Pillsbury points to a prominent and recurring problem in
the American study of Chinese security policy:
Some Americans wrongly believe Chinese views reflect a mirror
image of their own. This study suggests instead that the
Chinese have their own unique perceptions, which may be
difficult to appreciate.
The risk of mirror imaging our own views was an issue also
present in the study of the Soviet Union. Andrew Marshall,
Director of the Office of Net Assessment, cautioned against
assuming that a foreign nation’s strategic assessment is merely
a reflection of America’s: “Soviet calculations are likely to make
different assumptions about scenarios and objectives . . .
perform different calculations, use different measures of
effectiveness, and perhaps use different assessment processes
and methods. The result is that Soviet assessments may
substantially differ from American assessments.” Marshall’s
cautionary note also applies to understanding Chinese
assessments of the future.53

The study of Chinese IW could similarly succumb to such
temptations of mirror imaging. The following analysis
suggests some probable explanations as to why Chinese
strategists have so assiduously copied American literature
on IW.
The Chinese may have fallen prey to the intellectual
“noise” generated within the United States. In an
environment where the free flow of ideas, both good and bad,
is encouraged and valued at a premium, the American
system often produces an over abundance of information. As
Greg Rattray illustrates, the entire array of conceivable
institutions on national security, ranging from the military
services to think tanks to commissions mandated by the
president, have all chimed in on IW.54 Each of these bodies
has also prescribed a dizzying set of responses and policies
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in conducting IW.55 As one American columnist recently
commented on the Bush administration’s mixed signals on
U.S. policy toward Taiwan, “Cacophony in the form of
conflicting statements is America’s most effective form of
disinformation.” 56 The Chinese may have convinced
themselves that the euphoric descriptions of “full spectrum
dominance,” “information superiority,” or “system of
systems” are genuinely accepted in the United States as
truisms or have been achieved.57 For example, an analyst at
the Chinese National Defense University examining the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2020 believes that
the United States will achieve “all-round information
superiority” as touted by the document and warns that
China should maintain vigilance to counter such a
hegemonic trend.58 Accepting America’s apparent ability to
achieve such ambitious (if not questionable) military
capabilities at face value risks under-rating China’s own
potential.
Another more ominous explanation of China’s apparent
acceptance of American IW discourse at face value is that
the effort is deliberately intended to mislead the audience in
the United States. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that the
Chinese government may be releasing some of the current
IW discussions in an extensive deception campaign. China
may believe that by actively fostering a burgeoning
literature on IW, the outside world would be convinced that
the PLA is vigorously pursuing the formidable potential of
IW. Such a calculated strategy could be intended to unnerve
potential adversaries, disguise China’s actual intentions
and growing capabilities to maximize the element of
surprise, or to hide Chinese weaknesses and vulnerabilities
in IW. Beijing’s successes in whipping up nationalistic
fervor among the public through the state-controlled media
in the aftermath of the accidental Belgrade embassy
bombing and the April 2001 reconnaissance plane accident
highlight China’s ability to centrally orchestrate and
manage domestic and foreign perceptions. Turning the
previous point on its head, the Chinese may be generating
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their own set of intellectual “noise” to confuse and to keep
American defense planners off-balance. The diplomatic
maneuvers and the public relations contest between the
United States and the Soviet Union in the early years of the
space race provide a vivid historical example of mutual
noise making. Khrushchev repeatedly exaggerated the
capabilities of the Soviet space program to boost the Soviet
Union’s (and his own) image.59 The Soviets also deliberately
overstated the advances in strategic arms in order to
disguise the actual inferiority of their forces.60
This deception effort is only possible given the
authoritarian nature of the regime and the relative
insularity of Chinese society. However, China is undergoing
rapid social and economic change that has gradually
undermined the capacity of the authorities to control the
flow of ideas. For example, while heavily monitored by
Chinese authorities, the proliferation of Internet access has
opened a potential new avenue for bypassing government
control over information. The flourishing publishing
businesses not under direct government control have also
produced many controversial works that would have been
unthinkable a decade ago. For example, the release of
Unrestricted Warfare 61 (through a semi-independent
publishing house) caused a major sensation in Washington.62
The authors, two PLA senior colonels, advocated the
indiscriminate use of military and nonmilitary means to
attack the United States during conflict. The publisher’s
affiliation with the PLA suggested that at least some
elements of the military leadership endorsed the radical
ideas contained in the book. Interestingly, the publication
also spurred an intense and often divisive debate in China’s
military circles. There were fears that the authors may have
divulged too much information on Chinese thinking to the
outside world.63 In short, China’s gradual internal opening
will curtail the government’s ability to influence the media.
However, as China’s blatant news manipulation in the
aftermath of the April 2001 spy plane incident revealed, the
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state-controlled media’s impact will still be felt in Chinese
society for some time to come.
Falling in Love with the “Information Edge.” The IW
writings clearly demonstrate the powerful conviction
among Chinese analysts about the power of information.
The literature tightly fuses the accumulation of knowledge
with military success. Indeed, some authors describe the
relationship between information aided by advanced
technologies and victory almost in absolute terms. Many
writers declare that the accretion of knowledge and early
preparations would make victory inevitable. In other words,
information power determines the outcomes of wars. The
recurring references to the dictum that proper knowledge
would obviate the need to engage in actual combat
demonstrate the profound influence of Sun Tzu’s
philosophy. Moreover, there is an implicit and prevalent
assumption in the analyses that such knowledge is
attainable both prior to and during war. In short, the ability
to gather and process information appears to have become a
panacea in warfare for many Chinese IW strategists. This
belief in knowledge follows closely with Admiral William
Owen’s concept of a system of systems. He declares, “when
technology is correctly applied to the traditional military
functions—to see, to tell, and to act—a powerful synergy is
created, producing an effect much greater than the sum of
the components.”64 Premised on the power of information
technologies, he argues that “dominant battlespace
knowledge,” “near-perfect mission assignment,” and
“immediate/complete battlespace assessment” would create
the requisite conditions for victory.
What does not appear in the Chinese literature (and
Owen’s work) regarding knowledge and information is
equally instructive. Most analysts generally ignore the
harsh reality that data is not always accessible or perfect.
Accumulation of knowledge particularly under the duress of
war is often a haphazard and unreliable exercise. Indeed,
the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
in 1999 should have demonstrated quite clearly that even
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the most sophisticated military power remains subject to
the Clausewitzian fog of war. Beijing’s stubborn conviction
that the bombing was not an accident may in part reflect
Chinese illusions that technology does have the power to lift
the fog (although the real motive for the diplomatic bluster
may well be to extract political capital from the incident).
On a related point, most IW strategists tend to skirt the
practical application and hence the limitations of IW.
Chinese analysts do not discuss how one gathers, analyzes,
and disseminates information as a process. They similarly
exclude from their analyses the difficulties in assessing and
verifying data. The ability to harness knowledge is simply
accepted at face value as the solution to eliminating
uncertainty in war and the key to victory.
What accounts for this apparent blind faith in
information? First, Sun Tzu’s influence as a strategic
tradition remains very palpable. The literature survey for
this monograph demonstrates that the notion of winning
without fighting through superior knowledge is highly
appealing as a theoretical concept. Second, given that the
current discussions are conceptual exercises, most of the
writings understandably focus on the abstract and the most
ideal situations for information war. This tendency to
describe IW within the vacuum of theory often has the effect
of exaggerating the power of knowledge. Third, the defense
community in China remains deeply divided over the future
form of warfare. IW advocates must contend with
supporters of the traditional people’s war concept, still a
dominant force in the PLA, and the more conventional
high-tech warfare school of thought.65 As representatives of
a tiny minority view, they must present their case in the
most favorable terms. Hence, radical thinkers (like Owens)
are naturally compelled to promote the highly appealing
notion that knowledge will make winning without fighting
possible. The emergence of internal debates and political
infighting owing to the introduction of new concepts and
technologies is a prevalent if not inevitable phenomenon in
any defense community around the world. New ideas often
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challenge the entrenched interests of military
organizations, which are by nature conservative and
resistant to radical change. Authors sometimes must
produce provocative writings in order to propel the debate in
the hopes of breaking the status quo or changing the
existing order. The current literature on Chinese IW is
clearly no exception. Regardless of which explanation is
preferred for it, the general acceptance that knowledge is
the key to mastering IW could have direct consequences for
Chinese developments in IW.
Forgetting Clausewitz. Chinese writings on IW ignore
the inherently interactive nature of combat. The ability to
gather and utilize knowledge is always seen from the
perspective of the self rather than from the enemy’s
position. It assumes that the enemy does not enjoy the same
type of access to information or has not devised parallel IW
strategies. In concrete terms, “The notion that one can
expect to attack an enemy’s satellite and computer
networks while the enemy will not have thought to do so
against oneself, or that the enemy will not have tried to take
precautions against such an attack, is dangerously naïve.”66
The failure to appreciate the enemy’s IW strategies could
magnify the problems that result from an unquestioning
faith in knowledge as mentioned previously. The
assumption that the adversary has not devised counter
measures to deceive, mislead, or misinform could lead to
disastrous consequences. It might inflate Chinese
confidence in their ability to gather and process accurate
information about the enemy and thereby open themselves
to terrible blunders or miscalculations.
In Keeping the Edge, Victor A. DeMarines highlights the
inherent interactive nature of cyber information operations:
A difficulty inherent in CND [Computer Network Defense] is
that the attacker has the initiative, and the defender cannot
know the time and place of the next attack . . . A critical
characteristic of CNA [Computer Network Attack], which
creates numerous problems in planning its use, is its fragility.
Many forms of CNA are most effective when the enemy does
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not realize that it is under attack, because they can readily be
countered once the enemy knows exactly how the attack is being
carried out.67

In other words, computer network attack or defense,
while highly appealing, are fraught with uncertainty.
Without careful planning with the enemy constantly in
mind, the attack could be ineffective or the defense could be
circumvented by deception and surprise.
DeMarines also comments on the dilemmas that the
policymaker faces when employing computer network
defense or attack:
There is an inherent conflict between the requirements for
effective CND and the requirements for CNA. This conflict
arises whenever we discover a potential vulnerability in a
computer network. If we keep this vulnerability secret, and if a
future enemy does not independently discover the vulnerability
and protect against it, then we can exploit it for CNA. But if we
develop a defense against the vulnerability and deploy it widely
in our networks, we make it highly likely that the future enemy
will learn about the vulnerability and the defense, and we will
be unable to use it for CNA. However, if a future enemy
discovers this vulnerability independently, and we have done
nothing to protect our own networks against it, the enemy can
use it to attack us.68

The complex interactive process in IW means that the
action taken by one side could potentially be negated
immediately if the adversary is alert or aware. The linear
approach to IW that the Chinese appear to have adopted
ignores the Clausewitzian implications of a duel between
two opposing forces.
The Ghost of Sun Tzu Still Lingers. The presence of Sun
Tzu’s philosophy is inescapable in the IW literature. As
noted earlier, Sun Tzu’s notion of winning without fighting
and attacking the enemy’s strategy (command and control
systems) resonates powerfully with Chinese strategists. In
addition, Chinese discussions of IW as a tool for deception
carry a distinct overtone of Sun Tzu’s influence. As
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suggested above, Sun Tzu’s philosophy tends to reinforce an
unwarranted perception among Chinese commentators
that knowledge or information can become a panacea in
warfare. In short, traditional frameworks for
understanding strategy could have a distorting affect on
Chinese views of IW. However, some observers have
concluded that China’s strategic culture might in fact help
the Chinese benefit more from IW than the West. According
to an early study on Chinese IW, “Despite our technological
edge, we in the West may have much to learn from Chinese
views of conflict in the information age. Indeed, Sun Tzu,
with his emphasis on the power of ‘knowing’, may be more
relevant in the future than Clausewitz, for whom ‘friction’,
not information, was of overarching importance.”69 They
suggest that this cultural difference may in fact enable
China to achieve high levels of sophistication faster and
earlier than Western analysts have generally predicted.
Whether Chinese strategists have something useful to
contribute analytically by looking through the lens of Sun
Tzu or whether they have deluded themselves into
accepting the capacity of information power to lift the fog of
war remains to be seen. However, China’s ancient strategic
culture, which is deeply imbedded in contemporary
strategic thinking, will likely impact the future direction of
Chinese IW. More specifically, a combination of practical
considerations and strategic traditions will determine the
course and uniqueness of China’s IW program.
Notwithstanding the steady boosts in defense spending,
China’s military establishment still faces severe resource
constraints. In light of the economic uncertainty in the
coming years, China would not attempt or be able to
duplicate American efforts in IW. Moreover, Chinese
weakness in conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the United
States will force the PRC to focus on asymmetric strategies,
which might involve certain aspects of IW (although the
specifics remain unclear). In addition, Mao’s people’s war
tradition and Sun Tzu’s philosophy will likely exert both
conscious and subconscious influences on Chinese thinking
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on IW. For example, denial and deception and the notion of
fighting from a position of weakness will undoubtedly
dominate much of the discourse. Regardless of which
elements of IW Beijing choose to exploit, the Chinese will
likely pursue their own brand of IW that could deviate
radically from Western conceptions and models. The
pursuit of a unique IW strategy, which would not likely be
well understood in the West, could be a perfect formula for
achieving surprise (or abysmal failure) against China’s
adversaries.
How Different from American Thinking? The literature
suggests that Chinese strategists tend to conceptualize IW
in the broadest terms possible. Similar to U.S. thinking, the
Chinese expand IW to the psychological realm. However,
strategists broaden IW attacks beyond warfighting
purposes. They often discuss attacking the adversary’s
social, economic, and internal political structures.
According to one analyst, “The soul of informationized
warfare is to ‘subdue the enemy force without battle.’ Its
essence is to force the opponent to give up the wish to resist
and thereby to end confrontation and stop fighting by
ultimately attacking their perception and belief, using
information energy as the main means of action.”70 The
Chinese essentially hope to elevate IW to a higher level of
operational military art form. These strategists believe that
by tapping into the enemy’s thought processes, values, and
motives one can identify, manipulate, and reduce the
adversary’s will to resist and hence achieve victory without
actual combat. In concrete terms, IW attacks intended to
inflict pain on the adversary’s society might be employed to
impact public opinion and increase the political costs of
fighting against China (much like the use of strategic
airpower during World War II). The Chinese could direct IW
against America’s increasingly vulnerable and sprawling
critical infrastructure in order to complicate Washington’s
decisionmaking process. The Chinese could apply indirect
pressure on certain segments of the American population to
induce broader public panic in the hopes of reducing
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Washington’s political will to act in the event of crisis. For
example, consider the potential impact of tainting processed
food by infiltrating the manufacturing process via
computers.71 Whether the Chinese would take such action
without fear or in spite of potential American retaliation
and escalation will be the subject of analysis in the following
section.
In any case, it is clear that an assessment of Chinese IW
literature produces more questions than answers. Whether
the Chinese have reached the wrong conclusions on IW
within their unique political context remains unclear.
Whether certain aspects of the literature are intended to
mislead the outside world is equally unanswerable. The
environment of rapid change and innovation inherent to
information technologies compounds the uncertainties.
Moreover, China confronts the United States, its
designated potential adversary, who holds a dauntingly
tremendous lead. Chinese analysts are constantly
bombarded by the seemingly endless production of
American analysis on IW. The confluence of all these factors
may have shaped the sweepingly ambitious—and at times
seemingly unrealistic or naïve—analysis of IW among
Chinese strategists.
Assessing the Chinese IW Threat to the United
States.
Given the intense Chinese interest in IW, China will
likely devote substantial resources to studying the use of
and acquiring state-of-the-art information technologies. In
particular, China will seek capabilities that would help
gather, process, and exploit information on the battlefield to
establish an information-based military force. Command
and control systems, such as reconnaissance satellites and
surveillance systems will become important elements in
China’s force structure. Moreover, as a “latecomer” to the
information revolution, China may be able to reap the
hard-earned fruits of nations that pioneered IW warfare.
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The diffusion and availability of technologies could allow
China to leapfrog generations of obsolescent technologies
within the Chinese force structure.
Beyond the technological implications, future
developments in IW could have broader effects on Chinese
policy and strategy. Unfortunately, predicting the future
path of Chinese IW remains a haphazard exercise. As noted
above, the current Chinese literature itself reveals a
yawning gap between theory and practice. Since China is
notorious for shrouding any shred of data on defense
capabilities in absolute secrecy, it is unclear how the
Chinese might apply newly acquired IW capabilities. This
level of uncertainty on when and how China would master
IW adds greater urgency to understanding Chinese
strategic thought on IW.
One of the enduring puzzles is how China might employ
IW in the event of crisis involving the United States. An
area that deserves close study is the apparent attraction
among Chinese strategists to IW as a preemptive weapon.
Chinese strategists uniformly recognize that they are likely
to fight from a position of weakness. Hence when a conflict
with a superior foe occurs, China must seek to achieve its
political objectives while precluding an actual clash of arms
that would likely result in defeat. The literature suggests
strongly that IW capabilities might provide the “silver
bullet” for such a scenario. In essence, these strategists are
exploring IW as a tool to preempt conflict by attacking and
crippling the enemy’s vital points (command and control
systems) in order to reduce the adversary’s will to fight at
the very outset of war. Again, this concept dovetails closely
with Sun Tzu’s dictum of winning without fighting and
Mao’s people’s war concept of overcoming the superior with
inferior forces.
Mulvenon argues that the Chinese obsession with IW as
a preemptive weapon pose the most worrisome and
unpredictable policy challenge for the United States. He
paints a stark scenario:
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When one imagines scenarios in which the PLA would be
concerned with preemptively striking U.S. forces during the
deployment phase for early strategic victory, it is difficult to
avoid the obvious conclusion that the author is discussing a
Taiwan conflict. For the PLA, using IW against U.S.
information systems to degrade or even delay a deployment of
forces to Taiwan offers an attractive asymmetric strategy.
American forces are highly information-dependent, and rely
heavily on precisely coordinated logistics networks . . . If PLA
information operators using PCs were able to hack or crash
these systems, thereby delaying the arrival of a U.S. carrier
battle group to the theater, while simultaneously carrying out
a coordinated campaign of short-range ballistic missile
attacks, “fifth column,” and IW attacks against Taiwanese
critical infrastructure, then Taipei might be quickly brought
to its knees and forced to capitulate to Beijing.72

Mulvenon notes that the incentives for employing such a
strategy are three-fold. First, the proliferation of
information technologies enables China to gain access to
and develop such capabilities in a relatively short period of
time, especially when compared to a full-fledged
conventional buildup. Second, IW negates the need to use
China’s precious few air and naval assets for an invasion
campaign or massive attack against Taiwan, both of which
would likely result in severe Chinese losses or failure for at
least the next 10 years. Finally, IW, if sophisticated enough,
could create adequate levels of plausible deniability.
Mulvenon concludes that, “IW may currently offer the PLA
some attractive asymmetric options, some of which may be
decisive in narrowly circumscribed situations [emphasis
added].”73
Despite its theoretical appeal, preemption as an IW
strategy represents a double-edged sword. As Mulvenon
suggests, under certain circumstances, IW could lead to
decisive results. However, in the worst-case scenario,
preemption could be highly destabilizing and escalatory. As
Rattray argues, an escalatory response from the United
States is possible should the damage to U.S. critical
infrastructures prove to be extensive.74 Is it likely then, for
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China to unleash an IW attack that could invite escalation
in kind? If Beijing does intend to preclude U.S. intervention
in a Taiwan crisis, it is entirely conceivable that China and
the United States might find themselves in a dangerous
tit-for-tat face off. To successfully preempt an opponent, the
strike must be decisive and overwhelming. Once such
powers of IW are unleashed in a preemptive attack, the
ability to control and calibrate forces becomes extremely
difficult. Indeed, de-escalation may not be an option once
the Chinese order such an IW attack. Decisiveness of this
kind requires almost near-perfect knowledge of the enemy
and a very high degree of confidence in the ability to
successfully destroy the adversary’s vital points (both
extremely questionable propositions). Should such a high
risk attack fail due to faulty information or prudent
anticipation on the part of the adversary, the enemy may
not be deterred and may respond with even greater force.
Rather than the deterrent effect expected from IW (much as
the Japanese planners of the surprise attack against Pearl
Harbor had hoped), a reckless application of information
operations could provoke massive retaliation.
The literature survey on Chinese views of IW and its
convergence with preemption also leads to some other
unsettling conclusions. Notably, the apparent belief that
information is a panacea in warfare could breed dangerous
attitudes. In the tradition of Sun Tzu, Chinese analysts of
IW assert that knowledge can be assembled together in a
rational and coherent manner that would produce
inevitable victory. The assumption that superior
information can overcome the fog of war could encourage the
Chinese to devise ambitious IW strategies that might
backfire terribly when employed. For example, confidence
in attaining accurate knowledge prior to war and the
emphasis on preplanning often leads to inflexibility. As
John Keegan persuasively argued, the faith in war plans
among the belligerents of World War I led to what he called
“a tragic and unnecessary conflict.”75 Those war plans
meticulously laid out a very specific course of action that
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brooked little deviation. The underlying assumption was
that proper information and planning would determine the
outcome of wars. Indeed, all the plans anticipated quick
victories in a short war. The actual course of events led to
prolonged stalemate and mass slaughter. Europe’s hubris
at the time could similarly infect Chinese defense planners.
It is clear then, that the use of IW for preemptive
purposes could be highly escalatory and unstable in crisis
situations. The consequences of such a strategy could be
dangerously explosive, particularly in a conflict involving
the United States over a Taiwan crisis. This extreme
scenario of course assumes that the Chinese IW strategy
actually works. Beijing may also be equally unable to cope
with a massive and complete failure to achieve its political
objectives through IW. Given that an “IW Pearl Harbor”
remains untested and the means to assess damage are
underdeveloped and inherently difficult, it is entirely
possible that the attack would end in a pathetic fizzle.
China’s reliance on IW to conduct warfare at the expense of
other traditional capabilities could lead to a multitude of
unintended consequences.
If on the other hand, the Chinese are acutely aware of the
counter productive and possibly disastrous results of an IW
Pearl Harbor, they may be self-deterred from exercising
such an option. Is Chinese IW as an asymmetric threat
therefore a phantom menace? To what extent should the
uncertainty and ambiguity of the Chinese threat dictate
how the United States responds to China’s IW
developments? Examining and weighing the likelihood of
Beijing resorting to IW against the United States is
therefore a policy-relevant and extremely elusive task. Greg
Rattray’s formula for understanding strategic IW is a useful
model for assessing the Chinese IW threat to the United
States. Rattray states, “Despite the availability of
technological tools for digital warfare, the utility of
engaging in strategic IW for U.S. adversaries will vary
based on their political objectives, likely campaign
strategies, and willingness to risk retaliation and
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escalation.”76 He outlines four conditions for achieving
success in strategic warfare: (1) offensive advantage; (2)
significant vulnerability of centers of gravity to attack; (3)
minimal prospects for retaliation and escalation; and (4)
identifiability and targetability of enemy vulnerabilities
and assessibility of damage inflicted. Rattray argues that
strategic IW can only reasonably achieve an offensive
advantage. Given the uncertainties surrounding the
probability of success in employing IW, the Chinese might
also be constrained by these considerations.
Does this mean that China is not likely to employ IW? A
Chinese decision to use IW will depend on Beijing’s
perceptions of the external security environment and
internal politics. As Rattray argues, the broader political
context is the central starting point for understanding IW.
Clearly, Beijing would not likely use IW to reinforce its
territorial sovereignty over Tibet. However, on an issue as
explosive as the fate of Taiwan, self-deterrence could come
under severe strain. Therefore, the United States cannot
assume that since the Chinese face similar strategic and
operational constraints in the use of IW that Beijing will be
dissuaded from taking a risky course of action. Indeed, if the
stakes are high enough, such as losing Taiwan and, in the
process, destroying the Communist Party’s legitimacy, the
Chinese might be more tolerant of failure and/or escalation.
If a desperate Chinese leadership is sufficiently convinced
that they no longer have anything to lose from taking action,
reliance on IW as a preemptive “use it or lose it” option may
not seem so unattractive or dangerous. While the
probability of China using strategic IW is low at present or
in the short-term, the political context may change
sufficiently in the future to warrant caution and
preparation on the part of the United States.
We’ve Only Just Begun.
The policy implications in this analysis are clearly less
than sanguine. However, it is important to note as a caveat
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that the lack of reliable sources and the opaqueness of
China’s defense community preclude sufficient certainty on
the future direction of Chinese IW. As suggested above, the
Chinese may simply be following a familiar U.S.-Soviet
pattern of rhetorical theatrics. The Chinese are still
grappling with a nascent concept that even the most
developed countries are also struggling with. Moreover,
China’s capabilities are still too primitive to compete
against advanced military powers such as the United
States. In short, China will not be able to achieve the much
touted information dominance for some time to come.
However, it would be dangerous and naïve to simply
disregard the potential Chinese threat. Historically, the
concept of offensive IW has been a tightly held secret even
within the United States itself. The seemingly excessive
secrecy surrounding offensive capabilities has three root
causes. First, the United States kept this concept secret in
deference to the political sensitivities among allies. Second,
there were fears that touting offensive IW might engender
enmity on the part of adversaries in an act of self-fulfilling
prophesy. Third, as mentioned before, the frailties of
offensive and defensive IW strategies make them
vulnerable to countermeasures. Hence, even the most
transparent countries developing IW have been very
reluctant to reveal their strategies and capabilities. In other
words, the lack of evidence on IW has no bearing on whether
it exists or not or whether the country is proficient at it or
not.77 China is no exception.
As a final cautionary note, the oftentimes reflexive
response among some scholars to discount discussions of the
“China threat” as mere paranoia or hawkishness must be
tempered with some historical perspective. In many ways,
the post-Cold War period resembles the interwar
interregnum, during which military powers experimented
with new technologies, organizations, and doctrine. As
World War II approached, the balance of forces heavily
favored the Allied powers. The political will of the
leadership and the public mood in London and Paris had
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shifted from reluctance to surprising enthusiasm to fight. In
contrast, Nazi Germany did not field the best or the most
advanced military hardware. Yet, the hand wringing,
bumbling generals led by a madman and backed by a
German public with little appetite for war unleashed the
blitzkrieg that would shatter the French and British forces
in less than 7 weeks. How could this have happened? In
Strange Victory, Ernest May argues convincingly that the
devastating defeat resulted from the Allied failure to
anticipate German plans and to appreciate the magnitude
of British/French miscalculations. He concludes:
In sum, the essential thread in the story of Germany’s victory
over France hangs on the imaginativeness of German war
planning and the corresponding lack of imaginitiveness on the
Allied side. Hitler and his generals perceived that the weakness
of their otherwise powerful enemies resided in habits and
routines that made their reaction times slow. They developed a
plan that capitalized on this weakness. French and British
leaders made no effort to understand how or why German
thinking might differ from theirs. They neglected to prepare for
the possibility of surprise, and, as German analysts and
planners predicted, they could not react promptly once events
began to be at odds with expectations.78

The lesson from this analysis is that constant vigilance is
the only answer to avoiding ugly surprises. Further
analysis is clearly required but this preliminary study
suggests that China’s evolving attitudes toward IW could
pose an increasingly daunting and unpredictable challenge
for American policymakers.
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